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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kyle V. Jorgensen appeals from the district court's denial of his I.C.R. 35
motion for reduction of the sentence imposed upon his guilty plea to sex abuse of
a child under 18 years of age.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2008, Jorgensen and several of his relatives traveled to the St. Anthony
Sand Dunes with 10-year-old C.J. and several of C.J.'s relatives. (PSI, p.2.
the time, Jorgensen's father was dating C.J.'s mother.

(Id.)

1

)

At

During this trip,

Jorgensen took C.J. to the back of an RV that the families were sharing. (PSI,
p.6.) There, Jorgensen told C.J. to pull his pants down. (Id.) Jorgensen placed
his mouth on C.J.'s penis and performed oral sex for over a minute, until he
stopped after hearing other children nearby.

(Id.)

Later that day, Jorgensen

touched C.J.'s penis and showed him pornography on his cell phone.
Several years later, C.J. disclosed this abuse to police.

(PSI, p.2.)

(Id.)

Officers

arranged a confrontation call between C.J. and Jorgensen, during which
Jorgensen admitted to sexually abusing C.J. at the St. Anthony Sand Dunes in
2008. (Id.)
The state charged Jorgensen with one count of lewd conduct with a child
under 16 years of age. (R., pp.32-33.) Pursuant to an I.C.R. 11 plea agreement,
Jorgensen agreed to plead guilty to an amended charge of sex abuse of a child
1

"PSI" page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file
"ConfidentialExhibits.pdf." This file contains both Jorgensen's psychosexual
evaluation and presentence investigation report.
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under 16 years of age. (R., pp.48-49.) Jorgensen and the state agreed to jointly
recommend that the district court retain jurisdiction and impose a fixed sentence
of no more than two years. (Id) The parties further agreed that if the court did
not wish to retain jurisdiction, then they would jointly recommend a maximum
fixed sentence of two years and a maximum indeterminate sentence of three
years. (Id.)
At the change of plea hearing, the district court informed the parties that it
was unwilling to bind itself to the agreement with respect to the recommendations
that it retain jurisdiction and that it impose an indeterminate sentence of no more
than three years. (1/14/14 Tr., p.6, L.16 - p.8, L.9.) The parties then modified
their agreement, under which the district court would be bound only by the
recommendation of a fixed sentence of no more than two years.

(1/14/14 Tr.,

p.9, L.20 - p.10, L.21.) The district court agreed to be so bound and accepted
Jorgensen's guilty plea.

(1/14/14 Tr., p.10, L.16 - p.35, L.2.) The court also

ordered a psychosexual evaluation. (R., p.60; 1/14/14 Tr., p.35, Ls.21-22.)
Jorgensen chose not to fully participate in the psychosexual evaluation.
(PSI, p.1.) Jorgensen refused to answer any questions about his prior sexual
history except for that which involved C.J. (Id.) Jorgensen did complete other
assessments and answer other interview questions, and the evaluator concluded
that Jorgensen was a moderate-to-high risk to re-offend. (PSI, pp.9-12.)
Upon its receipt of the psychosexual evaluation, the district court withdrew
its consent to be bound by the modified plea agreement. (R., pp.67-69.) The
court emphasized that it had not yet determined Jorgensen's sentence and that it
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respected Jorgensen's constitutional right not to fully participate in the evaluation.
(Id.) However, it also stated that it was not willing to bind itself to any particular
maximum sentence in light of the limited information about Jorgensen available
to it. (Id.) The district court gave Jorgensen the opportunity to withdraw his guilty
plea prior to sentencing, but Jorgensen declined to do so. (Id.; 4/22/14 Tr., p.4,
L.17 - p.9, L.14.) The district court then imposed a unified 15-year sentence with
two years fixed. (R., pp.78-79; 4/22/14 Tr., p.21, L.11 - p.22, L.4.) Jorgensen
did not file a notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Three months later, Jorgensen filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of
sentence. (R., pp.96-97.) Jorgensen alleged that the district court violated his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in making its sentencing
determination because it used Jorgensen's decision not to fully participate in the
psychosexual evaluation against him at sentencing.

(R., pp.96-97.)

After a

hearing (see generally 11/25/14 Tr.), the district court denied the motion (R.,
p.105.).

Jorgensen timely appealed the district court's denial of the I.C.R. 35

motion. (R., pp.106-108.)

3

ISSUES
Jorgensen states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court violated Mr. Jorgensen's Fifth
Amendment rights by imposing a longer sentence as the result of
Mr. Jorgensen's decision to exercise his right to not answer
questions during a psychological evaluation.
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as
1.

Was Jorgensen's notice of appeal timely only from the district court's
denial of his I.C.R. 35 motion?

2.

Did the district court lose jurisdiction to rule on Jorgensen's I.C.R. 35
motion by failing to rule on it within a reasonable time?

3.

Even if the district court did not lose jurisdiction to rule on Jorgensen's
1.C.R. 35 motion, has Jorgensen still failed to demonstrate that the district
court erred?

4

ARGUMENT

I.
Jorgensen's Notice of Appeal Was Timely Only From The District Court's Denial
Of His I.C.R. 35 Motion
While Jorgensen frames his issue on appeal as a direct constitutional
challenge to the district court's sentence (see generally Appellant's brief), his
notice of appeal was timely only from the district court's denial of his I.C.R. 35
motion to correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner. This Court therefore
has jurisdiction only over Jorgensen's challenge to the district court's denial of
that motion.
Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) provides that a notice of appeal must be filed
within 42 days of the date evidenced by the filing stamp of the clerk of court on
the appealable judgment or order. Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) also provides that
the time to file an appeal from any criminal judgment is terminated by the filing of
a motion within 14 days of the entry of judgment where the motion, if granted,
could affect the judgment, order, or sentence in the action.
In this case, Jorgensen's judgment of conviction was entered on April 22,
2014. (R., pp.78-80.) Jorgensen did not file a timely notice of appeal from this
judgment within 42 days.

Nor did he file, within 14 days, a motion which, if

granted, could have affected the judgment or sentence. Therefore, the time for
Jorgensen to file a timely notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction
expired on June 3, 2014, 42 days after April 22, 2014. Jorgensen filed his I.C.R.
35 motion on July 11, 2014. (R., pp.96-97.) The district court entered its order
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denying that motion on November 25, 2014.

(R, p.105.) Jorgensen filed his

notice of appeal on December 10, 2014. (R., pp.106-108.)
Jorgensen's notice of appeal was thus timely only from the district court's
order denying the I.C.R. 35 motion. The state therefore construes Jorgensen's
Appellant's brief as asserting that the district court erred in denying his I.C.R. 35
motion to correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner.

11.
The District Court Lost Jurisdiction To Rule On Jorgensen's I.C.R. 35 Motion By
Failing To Rule On It Within A Reasonable Time
The district court will lose jurisdiction to rule upon a timely filed Rule 35(b)
motion if it does not act upon the motion within a "reasonable time" beyond the
stated filing deadline of 120 days. See State v. Chapman, 121 Idaho 351, 352,
825 P.2d 74, 75 (1992); State v. Tranmer, 135 Idaho 614, 616, 21 P.3d 936, 938
(Ct. App. 2001 ). The defendant bears the burden of showing the reasonableness
of any delay. As explained by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Day, 131
Idaho 184, 953 P.2d 624 (Ct. App. 1998):
[W]e make it clear that when a defendant files a Rule 35 motion, it
will of necessity become defense counsel's responsibility to precipitate action on the motion within a reasonable time frame, or otherwise provide an adequate record and justification for delay, to avoid
the risk of the trial court losing jurisdiction to consider the motion.
lg_., 131 Idaho at 186, 953 P.2d at 626. See also State v. Simpson, 131 Idaho
196, 197, 953 P.2d 636,637 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Payan, 132 Idaho 614,619,
977 P.2d 228, 233 (Ct. App. 1998).
In this case, the district court did not rule on Jorgensen's I.C.R. 35 motion
until November 25, 2014, 217 days after the judgment of conviction was entered
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and 137 days after Jorgensen filed the motion.

(R., pp.78-80, 96-97, 105.)

Jorgensen did not offer grounds as to why such a delay was reasonable, and no
reason for the delay is evident in the record. Therefore, even if the district court
erred in denying Jorgensen's I.C.R. 35 motion, Jorgensen is not entitled to relief
because the district court lost jurisdiction to rule on the motion.

111.
Even If The District Court Did Not Lose Jurisdiction To Rule On The 1.C.R. 35
Motion, Jorgensen Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred

A

Introduction
Jorgensen contends that the district court erred by denying his I.C.R. 35

motion to correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner.

(See generally

Appellant's brief.) Specifically, he contends that the district court violated his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination by utilizing his decision not to fully
participate in the psychosexual evaluation against him in making its sentencing
determination. (Id.)
Jorgensen's claim fails for two reasons.

First, a review of the record

reveals that the district court did not enhance Jorgensen's sentence or otherwise
penalize him for his decision to assert his Fifth Amendment rights with respect to
the evaluation. In the alternative, even if the district court made some adverse
inferences from Jorgensen's lack of full participation in the evaluation regarding
Jorgensen's risk to re-offend, and even if these inferences impacted its
sentencing determination, such inferences do not violate the Fifth Amendment
because they do not determine facts relating to circumstances and details of the
underlying crime.
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B.

Standard Of Review
"[C]onstitutional issues are pure questions of law over which this Court

exercises free review." Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 164, 321 P.3d 709, 714
(2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Likewise, whether a sentence
was imposed in an illegal manner is generally a question of free review. State v.
Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84, 218 P.3d 1143, 1145 (2009) (quoting State v.
Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 735, 170 P.3d 397, 400 (2007)).

C.

The District Court Did Not Enhance Jorgensen's Sentence Or Otherwise
Penalize Him For His Decision Not To Fully Participate In The
Psychosexual Evaluation
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b) provides that, within 120 days after the filing of

a judgment of conviction, a defendant may file a motion asserting that his
sentence was imposed in an illegal manner.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination applies to psychosexual evaluations that may be used by a
district court to support a harsher sentence. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 564,
149 P.3d 833, 839 (2006). Therefore, a defendant may decline participation in a
psychosexual evaluation ordered by the district court, and the court may not
penalize the defendant for this decision. 2 See id.

2

As discussed in Section 11.D., infra, the state asserts that a district court does
not unconstitutionally "penalize" a defendant when it makes adverse inferences
about the defendant's rehabilitative potential or risk to re-offend from his failure to
fully participate in a psychosexual evaluation. However, the state first asserts
that it is not necessary to reach that question in this case because Jorgensen
has failed to demonstrate that the district court increased his sentence because
of his decision not to fully participate in the psychosexual evaluation.
8

In this case, Jorgensen has failed to demonstrate that the district court
increased his sentence or otherwise penalized him for choosing not to fully
participate in the psychosexual evaluation. A review of the record reveals: (1) the
psychosexual evaluator's conclusion that Jorgensen was a moderate-to-high risk
to re-offend was based upon the information before it and the questioning and
assessments that Jorgensen did cooperate with; and (2) the district court was
plainly aware of Jorgensen's constitutional rights with regard to the evaluation
and stated on the record that it was not penalizing Jorgensen for asserting these
rights.
During the psychosexual evaluation, Jorgensen refused to answer any
questions about his prior sexual history except for that which involved C.J. (PSI,
p.1.) However, Jorgensen did participate in other aspects of the evaluation. (PSI,
pp.1-17.) The evaluator was able to: review the police reports, obtain information
about Jorgensen's developmental and medical history, perform the MMPl-2-RF to
assess Jorgensen's behavioral and emotional state, perform the AASl-3 VRT to
assess Jorgensen's sexual interests, and apply the Static-99R to assess
Jorgensen's risk to re-offend. (Id.) Jorgensen also made detailed disclosures to
the evaluator regarding the underlying crime.

(PSI, pp.6-8.)

From this

participation, the evaluator was able to determine that Jorgensen: demonstrated
a lack of remorse for his criminal activity, had a "notable tendency to present
himself in a positive light," and demonstrated a strong sexual interest in teen
males and a "prominent" sexual interest in school-aged males. (PSI, pp.4-5, 7.)
The evaluator concluded that Jorgensen was a moderate-to-high risk to re-offend.
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(PSI, pp.9-12.) The district court cited the evaluator's risk assessment and other
conclusions in making its sentencing determination. (4/22/14 Tr., p.14, L.3- p.16,
L.25; p.18, Ls.7-11.) At the hearing on Jorgensen's l.C.R. 35 motion, the district
court stated that the evaluator's risk assessment factored into its decision to
impose a longer indeterminate sentence. (11/25/14 Tr., p.6, Ls.2-11.)
The evaluator did not penalize Jorgensen or hold Jorgensen's lack of full
participation against him in making its risk assessment.

Correspondingly, the

district court did not violate the Fifth Amendment by considering this risk
assessment and other determinations of the evaluator in making its sentencing
determination.

The evaluator noted the limited information available to it but

stated that its risk assessment constituted the minimum known risk level, and that
the risk assessment could have been the same or higher had Jorgensen chosen
to participate fully. (PSI, pp.9-10.) In other words, the evaluator did not assume
that Jorgensen was a higher risk to re-offend due to Jorgensen's decision not to
fully participate in the evaluation. Instead, to the contrary, Jorgensen's decision
to assert his Fifth Amendment rights resulted in a risk assessment that was the
same or /owerthan it otherwise would have been. The district court therefore did
not violate Jorgensen's Fifth Amendment rights by considering this assessment
and the evaluator's other conclusions and observations.
During the course of the proceedings, the district court indicated several
times that it was aware of Jorgensen's Fifth Amendment rights with regard to the
evaluation and that it would not hold Jorgensen's decision to exercise these
rights against him in making its sentencing determination. At the change of plea
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hearing, the district court informed Jorgensen of his relevant Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights with regard to the evaluation, but also informed him that if he
chose not to participate, that it would make it "very difficult" for the court and the
evaluator to assess his risk to re-offend. (1/14/14 Tr., p.22, L.25 - p.23, L.24.) At
the sentencing hearing, after the district court learned that Jorgensen had
declined to fully participate in the psychosexual evaluation, the court specifically
told Jorgensen it was not going to hold his decision to exercise his rights against
him. (4/22/14 Tr., p.14, L.22 - p.15, L.2.) While the district court indicated that it
would be more difficult to make a proper sentencing determination, it recognized
that it had to sentence Jorgensen based upon "on what I know, not what I don't
know." (4/22/14 Tr., p.17, Ls.4-5.)
Similarly, at the hearing on Jorgensen's l.C.R. 35 motion, the district court
made clear that it had not enhanced Jorgensen's sentence or otherwise
penalized him for choosing to exercise his Fifth Amendment rights with regard to
the psychosexual evaluation.

The court also noted that the psychosexual

evaluator's risk assessment was based upon the information available to him.
(11/25/14 Tr., p.15, L.15 - p.16, L.5.) The court compared Jorgensen's decision
not to fully participate in the psychosexual evaluation to a defendant's decision
not to testify at a trial - noting that in both instances, no adverse inferences
regarding the facts of the case should be drawn from the defendant's decision to
exercise his rights. (11/25/14 Tr., p.22, Ls.5-16.) However, the court continued,
while such decisions may be advantageous to a defendant, there are also "some
natural consequences that may not be advantageous," such as being unable to
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tell one's side of a story to a jury, and being unable to provide information to an
evaluator that might result in a more positive risk assessment.

(Id.)

A

defendant's decision to exercise his Fifth Amendment rights does not immunize
him from such "natural" consequences. The court concluded, "I want to make it
very clear on the record" that its sentence was "in no way ... intended by this
[c]ourt to be a punishment for asserting his Fifth Amendment [r]ight." (11/25/14
Tr., p.23, Ls.13-18.)
Finally, a review of the course of the underlying proceedings and plea
agreements between the parties demonstrates that the court based

its

sentencing determination on permissible factors. At the change of plea hearing,
before Jorgensen had exercised his constitutional rights with regard to the
psychosexual evaluation, the district court stated that it was unwilling to be bound
by the parties' initial plea agreement.

(1/14/14 Tr., p.6, L.16 - p.8, L.9.) The

district court specifically informed the parties that it was not willing to bind itself to
the recommendation of a three-year indeterminate sentence due to the nature of
sex offense cases and its concern for the safety of the community. (1/14/14 Tr.,
p.7, Ls.2-17.) The parties agreed to modify their agreement, and based upon this
modification, the district court agreed to limit its sentencing discretion and to
impose a fixed sentence of no more than two years. (1/14/14Tr., p.9, L.20-p.10,
L.21.)

After Jorgensen decided not to fully participate in the psychosexual

evaluation, the district court withdrew its consent to be bound by the plea
agreement entered into by the parties. (R., pp.67-69.) However, the district court
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still only imposed a two-year fixed sentence. 3 (R., pp.78-79.) Consistent with the
concerns it expressed at the change of plea hearing prior to when Jorgensen
exercised his Fifth Amendment rights, the district court imposed a longer, 13-year
indeterminate sentence. (Id.) Because the district court's fixed sentence was
within the range it previously agreed to be bound by, and because its
indeterminate sentence was consistent with its concerns expressed prior to
Jorgensen's exercise of his rights, Jorgensen cannot demonstrate that the district
court unconstitutionally penalized him after learning that Jorgensen exercised his
Fifth Amendment rights with regard to the evaluation.
Jorgensen has failed to demonstrate that the district court violated his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination by enhancing his sentence or
otherwise penalizing him for his decision not to fully participate in the
psychosexual evaluation.

This Court should therefore affirm the district court's

denial of Jorgensen's I.C.R. 35 motion.

Because the district court's fixed sentence was within the range recommended
by Jorgensen and the state, Jorgensen challenged only the indeterminate portion
of his sentence in his l.C.R. 35 motion. (11/25/14 Tr., p.4, L.17 - p.5, L.7.)
Therefore, Jorgensen may only challenge the indeterminate portion of the
sentence in his appeal of the district court's denial of his I.C.R. 35 motion. State
v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1991) (generally, issues not
raised below may not be considered for the first time on appeal); State v.
Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, _ , 348 P.3d 1, 35 (2015) ("The invited error doctrine
precludes a criminal defendant from 'consciously' inviting district court action and
then successfully claiming those actions are erroneous on appeal."). Should this
Court conclude that the district court violated Jorgensen's Fifth Amendment
rights, it should remand the case for a redetermination of only the indeterminate
portion of Jorgensen's sentence.
3
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D.

In The Alternative, Even If The District Court Made Adverse Inferences
From Jorgensen's Decision Not To Fully Participate In The Psychosexual
Evaluation Regarding His Risk To Re-Offend, Such Inferences Did Not
Violate The Fifth Amendment
In Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999), the United States

Supreme Court held: (1) in the federal criminal system, neither a defendant's
guilty plea nor his statements at the plea colloquy function as a waiver of his right
to remain silent at sentencing; and (2) the Fifth Amendment precludes a
sentencing court from drawing adverse inferences from the defendant's silence
to determine facts relating to circumstances and details of the crime.
As discussed above, in Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 883
(2006), the Idaho Supreme Court held, based upon Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S.
454 (1981 ), that a defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
applies to psychosexual evaluations that may be used by a district court to
support a harsher sentence and that therefore, Estrada demonstrated deficient
performance from his counsel's failure to advise him of this relevant Fifth
Amendment right.
In White v. Woodall, _

U.S. _ , 134 S.Ct. 1697 (2014), the United

States Supreme Court held that the Kentucky Supreme Court's rejection of
Woodall's Fifth Amendment claim that the trial court erred by declining to give a
blanket no-adverse-inference jury instruction following Woodall's failure to testify
at the penalty phase of his capital murder trial was not contrary to federal law for
the purposes of deferential federal habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In
so holding, the Supreme Court recognized that Mitchell left open the question of
whether a sentencing court was constitutionally permitted to draw adverse
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inferences from a defendant's silence at sentencing other than facts related to
the circumstances and details of the crime. .lit at 1703-1705.
Therefore, while the Fifth Amendment precludes a sentencing court from
drawing adverse inferences regarding facts related to the circumstances and
details of the underlying crime from a defendant's silence, and from using those
inferences to enhance a defendant's sentence, the United States Supreme Court
has not answered the question of whether a sentencing court may draw other
adverse inferences from a defendant's invocation of the right to silence at
sentencing - such as inferences related to a defendant's risk to re-offend, lack of
remorse, or the defendant's rehabilitative potential - and then use those
inferences to enhance a defendant's sentence.
The open question recognized by Woodall in terms of United States
Supreme Court jurisprudence is also an open question in ldaho. 4 In Estrada, 143
Idaho at 564, 149 P.3d at 839, in the context of the circumstances of that case,
the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "imposition of a harsher sentence within this
[statutory sentencing range] based on a defendant's [unwarned] statements in a
psychological evaluation is a violation of the right against self-incrimination"
(emphasis added). However, it appears that neither the Idaho Supreme Court
nor the Idaho Court of Appeals have held that the Fifth Amendment precludes a

4 This

open question is not the same question that Idaho appellate courts
consider in determining whether a post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel has demonstrated prejudice from his counsel's failure to
advise him of his Estrada rights (i.e., where a court considers whether a
counsel's deficient performance in failing to inform a client of his Fifth
Amendment right not to participate in psychosexual evaluation ultimately resulted
in a harsher sentence).
15

sentencing

court from

drawing

non-Mitchell

adverse

inferences from

a

defendant's silence with regard to a psychological evaluation.
This Court should hold, as a matter of first impression, that a district court
does not violate the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by drawing
certain adverse inferences from a defendant's decision not to participate in a
psychosexual evaluation, such as those regarding a defendant's risk to re-offend
or rehabilitative potential.
In Mitchell, the United States Supreme Court explained the narrowness of
its holding:
The rule against adverse inferences is a vital instrument for
teaching that the question in a criminal case is not whether the
defendant committed the acts of which he is accused. The
question is whether the Government has carried its burden to prove
its allegations while respecting the defendant's individual rights.
The Government retains the burden of proving facts relevant to the
crime at the sentencing phase and cannot enlist the defendant in
this process at the expense of the self-incrimination privilege.
Whether silence bears upon the determination of a lack of remorse,
or upon acceptance of responsibility for purposes of the downward
adjustment provided in [the federal sentencing guidelines], is a
separate question. It is not before us, and we express no view on it.
Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 329.
In dissent, Justice Scalia underscored the narrowness of this holding,
stating:
the clutter swept under the rug by limiting the opinion to
'determining facts of the offense' is not merely application of today's
opinion to [the federal sentencing guidelines], but its application to
al/ determinations of acceptance of responsibility, repentance,
character, and future dangerousness, in both federal and state
prosecutions-that is to say, to what is probably the bulk of what
most sentencing is all about.
Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 340 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals relied upon the narrowness of this
holding and language from Justice Scalia's dissent in rejecting a defendant's
claim that a trial court violated his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination by drawing an adverse inference from his refusal to complete a
psychosexual evaluation. United States v. Kennedy, 499 F.3d 547, 551-552 (6th
Cir. 2007).

In Kennedy, the defendant pied guilty to distributing child

pornography and was sentenced by the district court to 87 months imprisonment,
followed by a lifetime of supervised release.

lsL

at 548-551. On appeal, the

defendant argued that the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment rights by
considering his unwillingness to complete the psychosexual examination in
making its sentencing determination.

lsL

at 551-552.

The Court of Appeals

concluded that Mitchell did not prohibit the trial court from considering the
defendant's refusal to complete the examination in its determination that the 87month sentence and lifetime of supervised release were necessary to protect the
public:
Given the narrowness of its holding, Mitchell simply does not limit
the district court's ability to consider a wide variety of "information
concerning the background, character, and conduct" of the
defendant in determining an appropriate sentence, 18 U.S.C. §
3661; to "order a study of the defendant," id. § 3552(b); and,
therefore, to consider the defendant's refusal to cooperate in
assessing what sentence is necessary "to protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant," id. § 3553(a)(2)(C). In fact, as
Justice Scalia aptly observed, "Few facts available to a sentencing
judge ... are more relevant to 'the likelihood that [a defendant] will
transgress no more, the hope that he may respond to rehabilitative
efforts to assist with a lawful future career, [and] the degree to
which he does or does not deem himself at war with his society'
than a defendant's unwillingness to cooperate."
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~

at 552.
Similarly, Mitchell does not limit an Idaho district court's ability to consider

a wide variety of information, including the extent of a defendant's participation in
a psychosexual evaluation, to evaluate a defendant's rehabilitative potential and
risk to re-offend. See State v. Martinez, 154 Idaho 940, 947-948, 303 P.3d 627,
634-635 (Ct. App. 2013) (a sentencing court has broad sentencing discretion and
is presumably able to ascertain the relevancy and reliability of a broad range of
information in making its sentencing determination).
In State v. Spencer, 70 P.3d 1226, 1227 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003), the trial court
imposed a less favorable sentence because the defendant failed to participate in
a risk assessment evaluation. After distinguishing Mitchell, the Kansas Court of
Appeals concluded that the sentencing court did not violate the Fifth Amendment.
~

at 1228-1230. The Court of Appeals noted that "[t]he trial court recognized

[the Fifth Amendment] right but correctly held that the exercise of such right has
consequences."

~

at 1229.

The Court also stated that "[w]hen adequate

information is not available, it is not error for the trial court to place a convicted
felon in the high risk status so that the needs of such a party will be met and the
highest services be made available so that probation will most likely be
successful and community protection will be achieved."

~

at 1229-1230.

In the present case, the district court did not go as far as the Spencer
sentencing court did in terms of constitutionally permissible assumptions. The
Kansas Court of Appeals held that it was constitutionally permissible for the
sentencing court to assume the defendant had a higher risk to re-offend based
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upon the defendant's lack of cooperation in a risk assessment.

kl

The district

court in this case made no such assumptions about Jorgensen, but instead relied
upon the risk assessment generated by the psychosexual evaluator.

As

discussed above, this assessment was generated through consideration of
numerous factors, and constituted only the minimum known risk level based on
the limited information available to the evaluator.
In Dzul v. State, 56 P.3d 875, 879-886 (Nev. 2002), the Nevada Supreme
Court rejected a similar Fifth Amendment challenge in the context of a
defendant's refusal to admit his guilt in the course of a psychosexual evaluation.
In so doing, the Court discussed the distinction between an unconstitutional
penalty imposed upon a defendant due to the exercise of his Fifth Amendment

rights and the deprivation of some potential benefit that the defendant might have
received had he fully participated:
We conclude that probation is a form of leniency and that Dzul was
not penalized in this case for refusing to admit guilt to the
underlying offense during his psychosexual evaluations. Instead,
he was not given a benefit that may be extended to defendants
who accept responsibility for their wrongs. Probation has been
regarded traditionally as a form of leniency. Moreover, the Fifth
Amendment does not insulate a defendant from all difficult choices
that are presented during the course of criminal proceedings, or
even from all choices that burden the exercise or encourage waiver
of the Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination. Further,
presenting a defendant with the choice between admitting
responsibility with a greater chance of receiving a favorable
psychosexual evaluation or denying responsibility with a greater
risk of receiving an unfavorable evaluation is consistent with the
historical practice and understanding that a sentence imposed
upon a defendant may be shorter if rehabilitation looks more certain
and that confession and contrition are the first steps along the road
to rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is a key factor in extending leniency
to convicted offenders.
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kl

at 883 (internal quotation, citations, and bracket omitted); see also State v.

Souder, 105 S.W.3d 602, 604-608 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the
sentencing court did not violate the Fifth Amendment by including the defendant's
silence in its "overall calculus" for determining whether the defendant was a
suitable candidate for probation, and noting that "candor is a relevant factor in
assessing a defendant's potential for rehabilitation" (citation omitted)); State v.
Blunt, 71 P.3d 657, 662 (Wash Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing that "most courts
have generally declined to extend Mitchell to prohibit inferences from silence in
the context of sentence enhancements that do not involve factual details of the
underlying crime"); Lee v. State, 36 P.3d 1133, 1141 (Wyo. 2001) ("A defendant's
failure to cooperate in the PSI is certainly a valid factor for a trial court to
consider in contemplating the appropriate sentence .... ").
In this case, it is clear that the district court did not make any adverse
inferences regarding either the factual details of the underlying crime, or about
any uncharged prior criminal conduct.

Despite Jorgensen's decision not to

discuss his previous sexual activity in the course of the psychosexual evaluation,
(and despite Jorgensen's statement to C.J. during the confrontation call that he
had "done this to [a] couple of people, but mostly my age" (PSI, p.44.)), the
district court expressly declined to make any findings or assumptions regarding
Jorgensen's prior criminal conduct.

(4/22/14 Tr., p.24, Ls.13-15.) The court

considered numerous mitigating factors including Jorgensen's lack of a prior
criminal record. (4/22/14 Tr., p.13, L.21 - p.14, L.2; p.19, L.6 - p.20, L.4.) With
regard to the possibility of Jorgensen having victimized other children, the court
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stated, "whether it's continued to happen with other people or not, I wish I knew,
but I don't." (4/22/14 Tr., p.19, Ls.9-12.)
Finally, on appeal, Jorgensen criticizes the distinction drawn by the district
court during the I.C.R. 35 hearing "between directly relaying the defendant's
decision to not answer questions as a reason for the sentence itself and relying
on the psychosexual evaluator's risk evaluation, which in turn considered the fact
that the defendant did not answer questions during the evaluation." (Appellant's
brief, pp.6-7.) This distinction, however, helps to illustrate the significance of the
difference between unconstitutional Mitchell adverse inferences and permissible
"non-Mitchell" adverse inferences. A psychosexual evaluator has a very different
role in a criminal proceeding than a sentencing court.

The goal of a

psychosexual evaluator is not to penalize or punish a defendant, but to evaluate
the defendant's risk to re-offend through assessment and gathering of
information. See IDAPA 57.01.01.010.11. Thus, the evaluator fills a unique role
importantly distinct from a sentencing court which is tasked with the duty of
imposing punishment on defendants. An evaluator's science-based conclusion
regarding the significance of a defendant's refusal to cooperate with the
evaluation does not offend the Fifth Amendment because it is not rooted in goals
of penalty or punishment.

Therefore, the state asserts that the Fifth Amendment

does not require a district court to disregard a psychosexual evaluator's risk
assessment or other conclusion that is based, in some part, on a defendant's
refusal to cooperate with the evaluation. A contrary holding would undermine the
evaluator's distinct role in the criminal proceeding.
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Jorgensen has failed to demonstrate that the district court violated his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination by enhancing his sentence or
otherwise penalizing him for his decision not to fully participate in the
psychosexual evaluation.

In the alternative, even if the district court made

adverse inferences regarding Jorgensen's risk to re-offend or rehabilitative
potential, these inferences did not violate Jorgensen's Fifth Amendment rights.
This Court should therefore affirm the district court's denial of Jorgensen's I.C.R.
35 motion.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's denial
of Jorgensen's I.C.R. 35 motion.
DATED this 1st day of December, 2015.
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